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ACCOUNTING: IN CRISIS OR ASCENDANCY?

Abstract
Recent corporate failure has challenged the credibility of the accounting profession,
leading many stakeholders to question the usefulness of financial reports for
decision-making. This paper examines fluctuations in the accounting profession’s
authoritative influence over accounting standard setting and financial reporting. It
focuses on the period following the collapse of the HIH Group in 2002, with
contextual reference to earlier periods. It then outlines the submissions made by the
accounting profession, actuaries and regulatory institutions to the Royal
Commission Inquiry into the collapse of the HIH Group. These submissions are
analysed in relation to the profession promoting functionally defined interests and
offering stable compromises, the questioning of the legitimacy of accounting
techniques by society and government, and the demand by other constituents that the
accounting profession overcome the inequalities that arise from current accounting
practice. Finally, the paper offers suggestions as to how the profession can
reconstruct itself to regain its lost authority.

Key words: accounting, associations, Australia, conceptual framework, corporate
failures, HIH Group, political economy.
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1.

Introduction

This paper examines developments in the Australian accounting profession
following the collapse of HIH Group in 2002, with reference to earlier periods in
accounting history. It focuses on fluctuations in the authoritative influence of the
accounting profession with regard to accounting standard setting and financial
reporting in Australia. The collapse of the HIH Group in 2002 is used as a case
study, and submissions by various groups to the subsequent Royal Commission are
used to highlight the problems facing the accounting profession. The paper
concludes by offering suggestions as to how the accounting profession can regain
some of its recently eroded authority.

A study of the accounting profession in Australia is of interest for two important
reasons. First, the Royal Commission appointed to investigate the causes of the HIH
Group collapse implied that a contributory cause of the collapse was a failure in
accounting practice (Main 2003, p. 263). Second, there has been an increasing
degree of intervention by the Australian government in the affairs of the accounting
profession in the period 1940-2002.

This paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework used
in this paper, which suggests that the accounting profession is a specialised social
institution called a ‘corporative association’, and which has the authority to
influence the society in which it exists. Section 3 examines the debate among key
institutions over the collapse of the HIH Group. The arguments presented by the
Australian accounting profession, the Institute of Actuaries in Australia (IAA), the
Australian Prudential and Regulatory Authority (APRA), the Australian Securities
and Investment Commission (ASIC), and the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) are
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reviewed. It is shown how this debate has influenced the reorganisation of the
authoritative influence of the accounting profession within Australian society.
Section 4 examines the developments within the accounting profession since the
1940s, focusing on its ability to influence society. This section also analyses the key
features of the conceptual framework used by the accounting profession. This
framework has served as a basis for setting new and revised accounting standards,
and has subsequently become the basis for the accounting profession to assert and
extend its authority. Finally, consideration is given to the possible underlying causes
for the present crisis of authority of the profession and suggestions are offered as to
how it can regain its lost position.

On 15 March 2001, the HIH Group was placed under provisional liquidation, and
the collapse that ensued remains the largest corporate failure in Australia to date.
The liquidation process could take up to ten years and the financial return to
creditors is expected to be negligible. In August 2001, suspicions about the role of
corporate mismanagement in the collapse led the Commonwealth Government to
appoint a Royal Commission, which released its findings to the public on 16 April
2003 (Department of the Parliamentary Library 2003).

The Royal Commission revealed several factors that contributed to the failure of the
HIH Group. These factors can be divided into two categories: business factors and
accounting factors. The business factors

included: over-priced corporate

acquisitions; corporate extravagance based on the misconception that ‘money’ was
available for spending; and the fact that the HIH Group (which had three authorised
insurance arms) was not operating according to the minimum solvency requirements
set by the prudential regulator, the APRA, and the Insurance Act 1973 (Clarke &
Dean 2001, p. 97; IAA 2002).
4

The accounting factors included: inadequate provision made for insurance claims;
past claims on policies not properly priced leading to an under-estimation of present
and future insurance premiums for any given industry class and claim category; the
internal audit committee focussing too much on accounts rather than taking on
additional functions to identify and assess overall risk; and the audit committee
meeting with the directors too often without the management (Clarke & Dean 2001;
IAA, 2002).

Of particular interest to this discussion is the fact that the IAA, in its submission to
the Royal Commission, noted that inadequate provision made for insurance claims
was a significant contributory factor to the collapse (IAA 2002). Thus the collapse
of HIH raised serious questions about the credibility of the accounting profession
(CPA Australia 2002; Malley 2003).

2.

Theoretical framework

According to Streeck and Schmitter’s (1985, pp. 1-29) model of political economy
theory, in industrialised developed nations the social order is characterised by four
types of institutional constituents. These are the community, the market, the state (or
the bureaucracy) and the ‘corporative association’.

According to Streeck and Schmitter, a corporative association is more than a
transient and expedient amalgam of the other three orders; in fact, it is capable of
making a predictive autonomous contribution to other constituents. Package-dealing
arrangements between corporative associations and interest groups are established
with the purpose of upholding the principles set by the corporative association –
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principles that are designed to construct a certain version of social reality (Hines
1988).

Corporatism is an attempt to understand the reciprocal relationships between
governments and corporative associations. It refers to the process of policy
negotiation between government agencies and corporative associations. The
resulting policy agreements are implemented through collaborative arrangements
between governments and corporative associations (Grant 1985, pp. 3-5).
Corporative associations must be willing and have the ability to secure the
compliance of their members to deliver the desired outcomes for their benefiting
constituency (Chubb 1983, p. 26). Both the government and corporative associations
take the lead in these arrangements, with both parties seeking each other out at
different times (Schmitter 1979, p. 27). This is because corporatist arrangements are
an unintended yet necessary outcome of various conflicts and policy crises where
neither government agencies nor the corporative associations are capable of
imposing their preferred solution upon the other (Grant 1985, p. 7).

Schmitter (1985, pp. 35, 39) cites four reasons for the inability of either side to
impose their preferred solution upon the other. First, corporative associations cannot
attain the status of monopoly constituents, or form comprehensive hierarchies of
sectors, without some degree of official recognition or encouragement. Second,
corporative associations often tacitly agree with or actively promote the policies of
government in order to secure their role as regular, integral participants of the
policy-making process. Alternatively, governments may implement their policies
without any such support or assistance from the profession. Third, an affected group
(a corporative association or the government) may refuse to organise appropriately,
or may refuse to participate in the process, if it considers the cost of collaboration to
6

be too high. Fourth, these arrangements for collaboration are made by relatively
autonomous groups within the government, rather than by government officials
themselves. Thus government officials, while less than enthusiastic about sharing
decision-making authority with corporative associations, have little control over the
selection of leadership within corporative associations. As a result, the government
is unable to ensure that the corporative association will accept and disseminate its
views or implement policy adjustments on behalf other constituents.

The accounting profession in Australia can be classified as a corporative association
for the following three reasons. First, corporative associations have as their common
purpose to defend and promote their functionally defined interests. Functionally
defined interests are the group norms of a collective actor that seeks to negotiate
with political constituents or to resist pressure exerted on it by the government.
Group norms are specifications of behaviour that all group members expect of each
other (Emerson 1962, p. 33). Such groups thrive on negotiating within a limited set
of special interest organisations that mutually recognise each other’s status and
interests (Kirkham 1992). The fact that these negotiations are carried out within an
‘inner circle’ can lead to the creation of inequalities between these special interest
organisations and other organisations that are impacted by the practices of the
accounting profession.

Second, corporative associations reach and implement relatively stable compromises
to pursue their interests (Armstrong 1998). Stable compromises involve the
opportunistic surrendering of attractive possibilities in exchange for accepting
negotiated obligations. These stable compromises result in the development of interorganisational trust backed by devolved public authority (Schmitter 1985, p. 58). In
creating stable compromises, corporative associations are primarily motivated by the
7

needs of their operative organisational context from which they receive resources
(Chubb 1983, p. 26).

Third, the motives of individual members within the profession are less discernable
than the motives of the association as a whole. Individuals have to surrender their
individual interests in exchange for accepting to be bound by compromised, longerterm and more negotiated obligations imposed by the professional associations
(Streeck & Schmitter 1985, pp. 1-29).

According to Streeck and Schmitter (1985, pp. 1-29), selectively giving advantage to
some interest groups over others, through the formation of corporative associations
(such as the accounting profession), leads to arbitrary standards, lack of public
accountability, and inequality. The accounting techniques used by the accounting
profession, it is argued, owe more to the patronage of their interests groups rather
than to any independent scholarly criteria (Hopper, Storey & Willmott 1987; Neu,
Cooper & Everett 2001). Therefore, there will come a time when the other 3 social
institutions - the market, community and government - will question the legitimacy
of these techniques (Hopper et al. 1987; Neu et al. 2001). For instance, market
forces can override actions taken by the corporative association that create patronage
in favour of their interest groups. Electoral competition and citizen interest can
dismantle the rules of the association (Clegg & Dunkerley, 1980, p. 5). Finally
government officials, who are wary of the excessive authority of the association, can
dismantle these rules by simply outlawing certain accounting techniques.

8

3.

Re-organisation of the accounting profession during the
debate over the HIH collapse

The collapse of the HIH Group was the most significant corporate failure in
Australian history. The Royal Commission appointed by the Commonwealth
Government to investigate this collapse called upon several key institutions to
submit their views. This paper will now outline the submissions made to the Royal
Commission by four institutions: the accounting profession as a corporative
association; the IAA as a social constituent; the APRA and ASIC as political
constituents; and the ASX as a capital constituent. Interestingly, what was clear in
these submissions was the intention of these institutions to reshape the authoritative
influence between their respective constituencies and the accounting profession.

The accounting profession as a corporative association
The proposal submitted by the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) on
behalf of the accounting profession presented a two-fold response to the HIH Group
collapse, consisting of stable compromises and the promotion of functionally
defined interests.

To arrive at a stable compromise with the government, the accounting profession
argued that it was willing to conform its reporting practice to the reporting
requirements of bureaucratic institutions such as the APRA, in accordance with
accounting regulation, if doing so would contribute to minimising the cost of
reporting by firms and satisfy the needs of all stakeholders. The only condition
accompanying this concession was that the reporting and regulatory principles
would be consistent (AASB 2002).
9

At the same time, the accounting profession was attempting to promote its
functionally defined interests with other accounting bodies, arguing that it was
inappropriate to fundamentally change accounting standards to conform to the
reporting requirements of the APRA. The accounting profession pointed out that
Australia had already decided to accept and implement the international accounting
standards of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) by 2005 (Policy
Statement 4 2002). For example, the accounting profession claimed that the IASB
standards might involve taking into account future premiums and claims in
determining the fair value of liabilities, given the fact that there would not be an
active market price for such liabilities. Thus the present direction of the IASB is to
determine that a fair value may involve discounted cash flow techniques. The
accounting profession, on the other hand, argued that prudential risk margins should
not be included in financial reporting insurance liabilities, because they are an
allocation of profits and thus take on the character of retained reserves. Instead, the
accounting profession argued that these margins should be presented in the equity
section of the financial statement. The accounting profession asserted that the
conceptual framework approach of defining and recognising liabilities using the
probability criterion (where ‘probably’ means ‘more likely than not’) may not
necessarily lead to the recognition of a margin of uncertainty as a liability.

The accounting profession further claimed that the substance of the contract should
determine the motive behind the transaction. AASB 1001 paragraph 4.1.8 asserts
that it is necessary that the substance rather than the form of a transaction be
reported to satisfy relevance and reliability concepts. Where the expression ‘pattern
of the incidence of risk’ did not suit some reinsurance contracts, the incidence of
risks should be recognised over the period of reinsurance (AASB 2002).
10

The IAA as a social constituent
In its submission to the Royal Commission, the IAA (2002) criticised the conceptual
framework of the accounting profession, questioning the legitimacy of its techniques
on three major counts: the probability criterion (SAC 4); the concept of reliability
(SAC 3); and the professional judgment accorded to accountants.

According to the IAA, the probability criterion in the accounting conceptual
framework can produce misleading results when transactions are bundled together to
determine probability. The IAA argued that current accounting concepts are more
deterministic (i.e. where variations due to random fluctuations have no place) than
stochastic (i.e. where some variation is understood to be subject to uncertainty). In
the deterministic approach to accounting, recognised assets are included in financial
statements, and any unrecognised assets and liabilities are ignored in the calculation
of equity. The conceptual framework of accounting (SAC 3) deals with reliability in
qualitative terms. Prudence and conservatism become desirable characteristics only
if these terms are interpreted in a way that obtains the best answer in the face of
uncertainty. However, they become unacceptable if they are introduced and
interpreted in order to create a deliberate bias. The IAA also argued that the
professional discretion accorded to accountants could lead to inaccuracy in financial
reporting.

The APRA and ASIC as political constituents
The APRA (2002) similarly criticised the legitimacy of the techniques used by the
accounting profession. Further, the APRA stated that it is important that consistent
accounting principles be applied worldwide without compromising the accuracy of
financial reporting.
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In its submissions to the Royal Commission, the ASIC (2002) also questioned the
legitimacy of the accounting profession’s techniques, claiming that there was a need
to overcome the inequalities created by these techniques. The ASIC submission
stated that complex and technical accounting rules are secondary, and that the
primary objective of applying accounting standards should be to ensure accuracy.

To overcome inequalities, the ASIC proposed a low-cost, rapid and decisive
mechanism to resolve disputes when the application of accounting standards gives
rise to difficulties. The ASIC claimed that it should be given the power to quickly
resolve any disputes relating to non-compliance with accounting standards by firms.
It also argued that inequalities result from the actions of the accounting profession
that compromise its integrity, such as longstanding associations between audit firms
and client firms. Audit firms should therefore be prohibited from providing both
auditing and consulting services to client firms. Further, according to the ASIC, the
law should strengthen the obligation of auditors to report non-compliance with
legislation, since it is difficult to detect non-compliance in the absence of qualified
auditors’ reports or ‘whistle-blowing’. Auditing standards should be given the force
of the law in the same way as accounting standards. The law should be more
explicit, requiring boards of directors to manage the relationship of firms with
auditors, so that directors can be held liable. In addition, it should mandate whistleblowing obligations for senior officers of firms and provide legislative protection for
them. Finally, the law should also clarify the role and obligations of officers of
firms, such as that of the chief financial officer.
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The ASX as a capital constituent
Submissions made by the ASX attempted to facilitate the smooth operation of
capital markets, by making stable compromises with the accounting profession, and
by seeking to overcome the inequalities created by accounting practice (ASX 2002).

In terms of a stable compromise with the accounting profession, the ASX reiterated
that listed firms should follow accounting standards in presenting financial
information. With a view to overcoming inequalities, the ASX took action to
implement two measures. First, it enhanced the current listing rule requirement in
relation to audit committees and the corporate governance reporting of firms
comprising the All Ordinaries Index (top 500). The ASX requires that shareholders
be given the opportunity to vote on the disposal or radical transformation of their
investment whenever firms seek to divest themselves of their main undertaking.
Second, when firms need to disseminate information about their activities, they are
required to provide opportunities for qualified analysts to ask relevant questions in
relation to publicly available information.

4.

Changes in the authoritative relationships prior to the HIH
collapse

The HIH collapse and subsequent changes to accounting practice did not, however,
take place in a vacuum. An examination of historical developments (that is, from the
1940s through to 2000) within the accounting profession in Australia points to a
series of events which strengthened the authoritative position of that profession over
a period of time (i.e. 1940s to 1970s), and another series of events which weakened
its authoritative position over a period of time (i.e. 1980s to 2000). In this latter
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period, the groundwork was laid for a major overhaul of the accounting profession,
culminating in the Royal Commission that followed the HIH collapse.

Rise in the authority of the accounting profession
Reinforcing functionally defined interests
According to Birkett and Walker (1971), in the period between 1946 and the late
1960s, the Australian accounting bodies developed a common strategy for defending
and promoting their functionally defined interests in order to consolidate their
authoritative influence.

In 1946, when major corporate collapses were virtually absent in Australia, the
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (ICAA) issued a series of five
‘recommendations on accounting principles’ based on recommendations issued by
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW). These
recommendations were later incorporated into the Victorian Companies Act 1938 to
cover accounting activities involved in preparing income statements and balance
sheets (Heazlewood 2002).

The spectacular crashes of the early 1960s of firms that had declared profits, and that
had received unqualified audit reports in the previous financial year, raised concerns
about the integrity of financial reporting (Birkett & Walker 1971; Chua & Sinclair
1994). In 1966, the threat of accounting standards being regulated saw the CPA
Australia (CPAA) and ICAA jointly form the Australian Accounting Research
Foundation (AARF). Although initially each accounting body continued to operate
its own accounting principles committees, in 1973 they agreed to form one
committee called the Australian Accounting Standards Committee (AASC), under
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the auspices of the AARF. The AARF became responsible for the preparation of
accounting standards (Heazlewood 2002).

Fall in the authority of the accounting profession
During the latter period, however, the accounting profession experienced a decline
in its authority. This was due, firstly, to the drive to overcome the inequalities
resulting from the application of accounting techniques. Secondly, questions were
raised regarding the legitimacy of the stable compromises created by the accounting
profession.

Overcoming inequalities
The rise in the authority of the accounting profession took a turn in 1984, when the
Accounting Standards Review Board (ASRB) was established under the auspices of
a statutory regulatory body National Companies and Securities Commission (NCSC,
now ASIC). This body was established as a co-operative scheme between the
Commonwealth and State governments. It must be noted that the ASRB was not
established by statute (unlike the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB),
which is discussed later in this paper). Rather, its roles and functions were shaped by
the unpublished decisions of the Ministerial Council. The ASRB was established in
the wake of calls for greater government and community involvement in the
development of accounting rules, the enforcement of compliance with accounting
standards by firms, and the need for accounting standards to be adjusted to private
sector needs (Chua & Sinclair 1994; Heazlewood 2002; Walker 1987). The
accounting profession’s preferred position, which was for the majority of positions
on the ASRB board to be filled by accountants, was rejected (Walker 1987).
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Professional authoritative influence, professional prestige and financial rewards are
legitimated by society. With the formation of the ASRB, the accounting profession
faced the possibility of the loss of this legitimacy, thus putting under threat the
successful advancement and social reproduction of the accounting profession (Hines
1989).

Offering stable compromises
This decline in the authority of the accounting profession was countered to some
extent by the stable compromises offered by the profession. First, the accounting
profession reluctantly agreed to accept the authority of the ASRB to approve
standards, but insisted on retaining the copyright on those standards (Walker 1987).
Second, the accounting profession agreed to set up the Public Sector Accounting
Standards Board (PSASB) under the AARF, which would extend the standard
setting function of the AARF to the public sector, thus ensuring that financial
reporting and management within the public sector would be of a high standardised
quality (Chua & Sinclair 1994). This led to a compromise between the ASRB,
controlled by the government, and the AARF, controlled by the accounting
profession, which worked together to produce a common set of accounting standards
for both the private and the public sectors (Armstrong 1998; Heazlewood 2002).

Questioning the legitimacy of accounting techniques
In this period, too, the Commonwealth government began to question the legitimacy
of accounting techniques and their implementation by the accounting profession. As
a result, the Commonwealth Government’s Corporations Law was amended by the
Company Law Review Act 1998, with the changes being operable from 1 July 1998.
The amendments to the Corporations Law reduced the authoritative influence of the
16

accounting profession in four ways. First, they authorised the AASB (formerly the
ASRB), where representation from the accounting profession was in the minority, to
develop accounting standards. Second, they overrode the ‘true and fair view’ of
accounting standards, by allowing firms to deviate from compliance with these
standards if directors could show that such a departure would lead to a ‘true and fair’
representation of financial activity in their financial statements. Third, through the
first Corporate Law Simplification Act, these amendments deviated from the
accounting profession’s preferred ‘reporting entity’ method of classifying firms.
Instead, firms would now be classified as disclosing firms, public firms, large
proprietary firms and small proprietary firms. Fourth, the amendments mandated
that a legal approach, rather than the substance-over-form approach preferred by the
accounting profession, would determine the status of a firm (Heazlewood 2002).

According to Puxty, Willmott, Cooper, and Lowe (1987), the accounting profession
is regulated by three principles. First, capital principles increasingly control,
improve and monitor employee and organisational performance. Capital market
pressures stimulate the development of disclosures. It has been argued that company
accounts, produced to facilitate the smooth operation of capital markets, have been
constructed and audited without the impetus of regulation (Watts & Zimmerman
1986, pp. 15-36). Second, government principles such as legislation (for example,
the preparation and publication of company accounts as a legal requirement) and
regulation (for example, minimal wages and price ceilings) are increasingly shaping
the reproduction and formation of the accountancy profession (Hopwood 1983).
These laws and requirements have restricted the self-governance of the profession,
making it subject to government supervision. Third, community principles, such as
expectations regarding the nature and role of the profession (for example,
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expectations of honourable conduct, expertise, honesty and public service), are
adopted in response to the ideals and expectations of the community.

Puxty et al. (1987) have argued that the regulation of the accounting profession
should be understood within the nexus of the other three constituents: market forces
(capital or economic); bureaucratic controls (government or political); and
spontaneous solidarity (community or social). These principles can be better
understood by comparing and contrasting them with the sources of motivation and
authority that lead to action, and with the sources of tension and violation that result
from such action.

The changes during the 1980s detailed above forced the accounting profession to
present its financial reports in a more consistent and logical manner. This was partly
in response to the fact that the public generally views accounting as an objective
practice, since it deals with numbers, and that it subsequently views rules and
uniformity as offering solutions to the perceived problem of accounting subjectivity
(Merino & Mayper 2002). Since the previously designed rules in accounting had
been manipulated by firms (Knight & Beyer 1991, pp. 1-2; Kohler 1991, p. 64;
Rogers & Menon 1985, pp. 547-548), the accounting profession designed a uniform
basis for financial reporting (Rowles 1991, pp. 69-70), by creating a new conceptual
framework. According to Hines (1989), this was an attempt by the accounting
profession to pre-empt government intervention, by strengthening its own legitimacy
via the creation of stable compromises.

The new framework was structured as an interrelated set of propositions and
observations that provided a logical foundation for deducing what accounting
principles ought to be (ASRB/AARF 1990, pp. 1-6). These principles were to be
18

empirically tested before their introduction in order to ensure that they did, in fact,
result in greater accuracy in financial reporting (Walker 2003). Despite divided
opinions about the nature of a ‘true and fair view’ of accounting, proponents of the
conceptual framework have asserted that the application of the qualitative
characteristics of the framework and its associated accounting standards will lead to
a ‘true and fair’ outcome (Cairns 2001).

5. Conclusion and proposals
The foregoing analysis is summarised in Table 1. The analysis of events following
the HIH Group collapse highlights the way in which social and political constituents
questioned the legitimacy of the financial reporting techniques used by the
accounting profession. The accounting profession responded by offering stable
compromises to ensure its continued existence. Further, the various political and
capital constituents that contributed to the Royal Commission proposed ways of
overcoming the inequalities resulting from the technical application of financial
reporting. Finally, the capital constituents essentially supported the techniques used
by the accounting profession, offering stable compromises while simultaneously
attempting to overcome the inequalities created by current accounting practice.

Table 1: Forces shaping the authoritative influence of the profession
Forces\Constituents

Questioning legitimacy

Social

Capital

X

Corporative Association

X

Offering stable compromises

X

Overcoming inequalities

X

Reinforcing functionally defined
interests

Political

X
X

X
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The final Report of the HIH Group Royal Commission emphasised the importance
of the AASB 1023 standard, which deals with general insurance. The Report noted
that, at the time of the HIH collapse, the accounting standard did not carry a
definition of ‘material transfer of risk’. A definition of risk is necessary in order to
accurately classify whether an insurance policy constitutes reinsurance or one of the
more rapacious and illusory forms of financial insurance. Further, of 61
recommendations put forward by the Report, 23 related to increasing the APRA’s
ability to more effectively carry out its responsibilities. These recommendations
invariably contributed to the shifting of authoritative influence from the accounting
profession to the government (Main 2003, p. 265).

As indicated in this paper, the challenge to the authoritative influence of the
accounting profession had its roots earlier in the century. Events not only following,
but also prior to, the HIH Group collapse demonstrated that neither the accounting
profession nor the other constituents are capable of imposing their preferred solution
with regard to accounting standard setting and financial reporting. Rather, the
relationship between these groups is characterised by a competition for authoritative
influence. The accounting profession seeks to increase its authoritative influence
through a dual strategy involving the promotion of functionally defined interests on
the one hand, and the implementation of stable compromises on the other. The
government, on its part, attempts to increase its authoritative influence by seeking
ways to overcome the inequalities resulting from accounting practice, and by
questioning the legitimacy of accounting techniques. The resulting compromises are
necessary for restoring confidence in the accounting profession among constituents,
such as the community and capital providers.
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Thus the allocation of authoritative influence between the accounting profession and
other constituents is by no means one-way. For example, as pointed out by
Schmitter (1985, pp. 35, 39), the accounting profession requires the official
recognition or encouragement of other constituents in order to form a monopoly or
comprehensive hierarchy. At the same time, however, the government depends on
the accounting profession when it makes and implements policies and to bring about
its desired adjustments.

Clearly, then, no single interest group can impose its preferred solution with regard
to accounting standard setting and financial reporting. However, our survey of
historical developments within the accounting profession points to five ways in
which an interest group such as the accounting profession can enhance the
possibility of its solutions being accepted. The first way is to present a more united
front when expressing demands for negotiation and compromise, in order to
reinforce the functionally defined interests of the accounting profession. Thus the
two major accounting bodies, the CPAA and ICAA, should jointly present the
demands of the profession. The second way is to centralise the internal structure of
the accounting profession in order to increase consensus formation and member
compliance. This may involve joint voting of members of both accounting bodies on
important issues common to the profession. The third way is to modernise the
interest group to increase its professionalism. This can be achieved by increasing the
mandatory professional development hours to be completed by members of the
accounting body over a given period. It can also involve raising the ethical
requirements of members and increasing the penalties for non-compliance. The
fourth way is to steer modernised interest groups to contribute to corporatist cooperation (Marin 1985, pp. 97-100). This can involve pro-active participation in
decision-making by other constituents. Finally, the fifth way is to forge partnerships
21

between private and public interest groups in the delivery of products and services
(King 1985, p. 205).

In the last part of the twentieth century, the authoritative influence of the accounting
profession has been challenged. In particular, the collapse of the HIH group in 2002
highlighted the counter-influence that can be exercised by capital, social and
political constituents against the authoritative influence of the accounting profession.
Important lessons can be gleaned from the events surrounding the HIH collapse that
can assist in upholding and strengthening the authoritative influence of the
profession. At the same time, these events have highlighted the need for the
accounting profession to reduce inequalities that may result from accounting
practices, strengthen functionally defined interests between the CPAA and ICAA in
designing and implementing accounting practice, and negotiate compromises with
interest groups.
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